| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16337 |
| DP16337 The Benefits of Access: Evidence from Private Meetings with Portfolio Firms | |
| Marco Becht; Julian Franks; Hannes Wagner | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-07-07 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze the monitoring efforts of a large active asset manager that involve high-level private meetings with portfolio firms that are unobservable to outsiders. Our analysis reveals the inner workings of the asset management organization based on detailed records of contacts with executives and board members of portfolio firms, internal analyst recommendations, voting decisions, and daily fund-level stock holdings. Private meetings generate pronounced trading patterns, with fund managers trading on and around meeting days and votes. Our results show that engagement with target firms generates insights and information advantages, increases trading and is associated with significant abnormal returns. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Active investors Trading Institutional investors Corporate governance Stewardship Active ownership Shareholder voting Analysts Fund managers |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16337 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545301 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marco Becht,Julian Franks,Hannes Wagner. DP16337 The Benefits of Access: Evidence from Private Meetings with Portfolio Firms. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
