| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16294 |
| DP16294 Sticky Spending, Sequestration, and Government Debt | |
| Facundo Piguillem; Alessandro Riboni | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-06-25 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Once established, government spending programs tend to continue. Spending inertia can lead to unsustainable debt levels that require fiscal stabilization, such as “sequestration.” We develop a political economy model of debt with sticky spending by assuming that the government must maintain a fraction of past spending. We show that inertia insures against the risk of political turnover, which may reduce politicians’ incentives to accumulate debt. However, if preexisting commitments are large, as in the current U.S. context, inertia exacerbates incentives to increase debt; faced with the prospect of stabilization, the government overspends to “dilute” the spending commitments of past administrations. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Government debt Mandatory and discretionary spending Entitlement spending reform Delayed stabilization Budgetary inertia |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16294 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545259 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Facundo Piguillem,Alessandro Riboni. DP16294 Sticky Spending, Sequestration, and Government Debt. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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