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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP16207 |
DP16207 Bank Runs, Bank Competition and Opacity | |
Toni Ahnert; David Martinez-Miera | |
发表日期 | 2021-06-01 |
出版年 | 2021 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We model the opacity and deposit rate choices of banks that imperfectly compete for uninsured deposits, are subject to runs, and face a threat of entry. We show how shocks that increase bank competition or bank transparency increase deposit rates, costly withdrawals, and thus bank fragility. Therefore, perfect competition is not socially optimal. We also propose a theory of bank opacity. The cost of opacity is more withdrawals from a solvent bank, lowering bank profits. The benefit of opacity is to deter the entry of a competitor, increasing future bank profits. The excessive opacity of incumbent banks rationalizes transparency regulation. |
主题 | Financial Economics |
关键词 | Competition Entry Opacity Bank run Fragility Global games Competition policy Transparency regulation |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16207-0 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545178 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Toni Ahnert,David Martinez-Miera. DP16207 Bank Runs, Bank Competition and Opacity. 2021. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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