| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16024 |
| DP16024 Negative results in science: Blessing or (winner's) curse ? | |
| Catherine Bobtcheff; Raphaël Levy; Thomas Mariotti | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-04-09 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Two players receiving independent signals on a risky project with common value compete to be the first to innovate. We characterize the equilibrium of this preemption game as the publicity of signals varies. Private signals create a winner's curse: investing first implies that the rival has abstained from investing, possibly because he has privately received adverse information about the project. Since players want to gather more evidence in support of the project as a compensation, they invest later when signals are more likely to be private. Because of preemption, the NPV of investment is zero at equilibrium regardless of the publicity of signals. However, for a conservative planner who cares about avoiding unprofitable investments, this implies that investment arises too early at equilibrium, and such a planner then prefers signals to be private. This provides a rationale against the mandatory disclosure of negative results in science, notably when competition is severe. Our results suggest that policy interventions should primarily tackle winner-takes-all competition, and regulate transparency only once competition is sufficiently mild. |
| 主题 | Organizational Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16024 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545006 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Catherine Bobtcheff,Raphaël Levy,Thomas Mariotti. DP16024 Negative results in science: Blessing or (winner's) curse ?. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
