| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15970 |
| DP15970 On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries | |
| Patrick W. Schmitz | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-03-26 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Consider a buyer and a seller who have agreed to trade an intermediate good. It is ex-post efficient to adapt the good to the prevailing state of the world. The seller has private information about the costs of adapting the good. In the case of non-integration, the buyer has no possibility to verify claims that the seller makes about her costs. In the case of vertical integration, the buyer can verify evidence about the costs that the seller might be able to provide. Even though we assume no further differences between the ownership structures, it turns out that the parties may prefer non-integration. |
| 主题 | Organizational Economics |
| 关键词 | Incomplete contracts Make-or-buy decision Property rights approach Private information Outsourcing |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15970 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544959 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick W. Schmitz. DP15970 On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries. 2021. |
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