| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15928 |
| DP15928 Taxes and Turnout: When the decisive voter stays at home | |
| Felix Bierbrauer; Aleh Tsyvinski; Nicolas Werquin | |
| 发表日期 | 2021-03-16 |
| 出版年 | 2021 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a model of political competition with endogenous turnout and endogenous platforms. Parties trade off incentivizing their supporters to vote and discouraging the supporters of the competing party from voting. We show that the latter objective is particularly pronounced for a party with an edge in the political race. Thus, an increase in political support for a party may lead to the adoption of policies favoring its opponents so as to asymmetrically demobi- lize them. We study the implications for the political economy of redistributive taxation. Equilibrium tax policy is typically aligned with the interest of voters who are demobilized. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15928 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544919 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Felix Bierbrauer,Aleh Tsyvinski,Nicolas Werquin. DP15928 Taxes and Turnout: When the decisive voter stays at home. 2021. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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