G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP15727
DP15727 The Inefficient Combination: Competitive Markets, Free Entry, and Democracy
Ragnar Torvik; Halvor Mehlum; Gisle Natvik
发表日期2021-01-27
出版年2021
语种英语
摘要We show that under fairly general conditions, the combination of (i) competitive markets, (ii) free entry, and (iii) democracy is inconsistent with allocative efficiency. This fundamental impossibility result, which has not been derived before, holds whenever not only prices, but also policy, responds to factor allocations. We develop a theory where agents enter an occupation (more generally, enter an economic activity) and thereafter make a policy decision. Thus, each voter's self interest becomes endogenous to the entry decision. In our baseline model, the policy instrument that citizens decide upon is simply taxation. Workers in occupations whose services are in high demand by the government have an incentive to vote for high taxes. Voters in occupations whose services are in low demand by the government have an incentive to vote for low taxes. We show that the socially efficient size of the public sector cannot be sustained in equilibrium, despite free entry into occupations. We generalize our theory, and show how our impossibility result extends well beyond the baseline model. We also discuss how departing from competitive markets may affect equilibrium outcomes. Our analysis implies that when assessing causes and consequences of factor allocations, it is key to acknowledge how allocations affect not only prices, but also policies.
主题Macroeconomics and Growth ; Public Economics
关键词Political economy Efficiency and democracy Endogenous political interests The size of government Labor market institutions Dutch disease
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp15727
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544733
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Ragnar Torvik,Halvor Mehlum,Gisle Natvik. DP15727 The Inefficient Combination: Competitive Markets, Free Entry, and Democracy. 2021.
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