| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP15698
|
| DP15698 The Focusing Effect in Negotiations |
| Heiko Karle; Andrea Canidio
|
| 发表日期 | 2021-01-23
|
| 出版年 | 2021
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Two players with preferences distorted by the focusing effect (Koszegi and Szeidl, 2013) negotiate an agreement over several issues and one transfer. Our main result is that, as long as their preferences are differentially distorted, an issue will be inefficiently left out of the agreement or inefficiently included in the agreement whenever the importance of the other issues on the table is sufficiently large. When this is the case,
the salience of the transfer dimension is large for both players, but differentially so, therefore creating a form of disagreement between them. In extreme cases, this could lead to an inefficient breakdown of the negotiation. Anticipating this possibility, the negotiating parties may negotiate in stages, by first signing an incomplete agreement and later finalizing the outcome of the negotiation. As in Raiffa (1982), these
incomplete agreements may impose bounds on some dimensions of the bargaining solution in order to reduce their salience. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Salience
Focusing effect
Bargaining
Negotiations
Incomplete agreements
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15698
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544705
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Heiko Karle,Andrea Canidio. DP15698 The Focusing Effect in Negotiations. 2021.
|
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