| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15554 |
| DP15554 Technology-Neutral vs. Technology-Specific Procurement | |
| Natalia Fabra; Juan Pablo Montero | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-12-13 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | An imperfectly-informed regulator needs to procure multiple units of a good that can be produced with heterogeneous technologies at various costs. Should she run technology-specific or technology-neutral auctions? Should she allow for partial separation across technologies (technology banding)? Should she instead post separate prices for each technology? What are the trade-offs involved? We find that one size does not fit all: the preferred instrument depends on the nature of the available technologies, the extent of information asymmetry regarding their costs, the costs of public funds, and the degree of market power. Using Spanish data on recently deployed renewables across the country, we illustrate how our theory can shed light on how to more effectively procure these technologies. Beyond this motivation/application, the question of how to procure public goods in the presence of multiple technologies is relevant for a wide variety of goods, including central banks liquidity, pollution reduction, or land conservation, among others. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Procurement Auctions Quantity regulation Price regulation Third degree price discrimination market power |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15554 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544560 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Natalia Fabra,Juan Pablo Montero. DP15554 Technology-Neutral vs. Technology-Specific Procurement. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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