| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15523 |
| DP15523 Why Have CEO Pay Levels Become Less Diverse? | |
| Gaizka Ormazabal; Torsten Jochem; Anjana Rajamani | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-12-06 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We document that, over the last decade, the cross-sectional variation in CEO pay levels has declined precipitously, both at the economy level and within industry and industry-size groups. We find evidence consistent with one potential explanation for this pattern; reciprocal benchmarking (i.e., firms are more likely to include each other in the disclosed set of peers used to benchmark pay levels). We also find empirical support for three factors contributing to the increase in reciprocal benchmarking; the mandatory disclosure of compensation peer groups, say on pay, and proxy advisory influence. Finally, we find that reciprocal benchmarking has meaningful consequences on managerial behavior; it reduces risk-taking by weakening external tournament incentives. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Clustering of executive pay Pay diversity Competitive benchmarking Pay transparency Pay disclosure Tournament incentives |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15523 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544525 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gaizka Ormazabal,Torsten Jochem,Anjana Rajamani. DP15523 Why Have CEO Pay Levels Become Less Diverse?. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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