Gateway to Think Tanks
来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP15270 |
DP15270 Abstentions and Social Networks in Congress | |
Marco Battaglini; Valerio Leone Sciabolazza; Eleonora Patacchini | |
发表日期 | 2020-09-09 |
出版年 | 2020 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We study the extent to which personal connections among legislators influence abstentions in the U.S. Congress. Our analysis is conducted by observing representatives' abstention for the universe of roll call votes held on bills in the 109th-113th Congresses. Our results show that a legislator's propensity to abstain increases when the majority of his or her alumni connections abstains, even after controlling for other well-known predictors of abstention choices and a vast set of fixed effects. We further reveal that a legislator is more prone to abstain than to take sides when the demands from personal connections conflict with those of the legislator's party. |
主题 | Public Economics |
关键词 | Abstention U.s. congress Social Networks Alumni networks |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15270 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544245 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marco Battaglini,Valerio Leone Sciabolazza,Eleonora Patacchini. DP15270 Abstentions and Social Networks in Congress. 2020. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。