| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP15136
|
| DP15136 Equilibrium Reforms and Endogenous Complexity |
| Massimo Morelli; Dana Foarta
|
| 发表日期 | 2020-08-06
|
| 出版年 | 2020
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Decision makers called to evaluate and approve a reform, proposed by an interest group, a politician, or a bureaucracy, suffer from a double asymmetric information problem: about the competence of the proposer and the consequences of the proposal. Moreover, the ability of decision makers to evaluate proposals depends on the complexity of the legislative environment, itself a product of past reforms. We model the strategic interaction between reformers and decision makers as a function of legislative complexity, and study the dynamics of endogenous complexity and stability of reforms. Complexication-simplication cycles can occur on the equilibrium path, and expected long-run complexity may be higher when competence of reform proposers is lower. The results apply to regulatory reforms, legislative politics, and institutional design. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
|
| 关键词 | Information
Regulatory complexity
Competence
Interest groups
Politicians
Bureaucracy
Checks and balances
Incremental reforms
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15136
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544098
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Massimo Morelli,Dana Foarta. DP15136 Equilibrium Reforms and Endogenous Complexity. 2020.
|
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