| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15115 |
| DP15115 Relative Performance Evaluation, Sabotage and Collusion | |
| Matthew Bloomfield; Catarina Marvão; Giancarlo Spagnolo | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-07-30 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine whether the potential for costly sabotage is a deterrent to firms' use of relative performance evaluation ("RPE") in CEO pay plans. We exploit illegal cartel membership as a source of variation in the potential for costly sabotage and document that firms are more likely to use RPE if they are currently cartel members. Moreover, firms frequently drop RPE from their CEOs' pay plans immediately after their cartels are detected. We further provide suggestive evidence that the potential for costly sabotage explains these patterns; cartel membership severs the empirical association between RPE and competitive aggression. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Compensation Collusion Cartels Relative performance evaluation Sabotage |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15115 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544073 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Matthew Bloomfield,Catarina Marvão,Giancarlo Spagnolo. DP15115 Relative Performance Evaluation, Sabotage and Collusion. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
