G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP15111
DP15111 Progressive Participation
Dirk Bergemann; Philipp Strack
发表日期2020-07-30
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要A single seller faces a sequence of buyers with unit demand. The buyers are forward-looking and long-lived but vanish (and are replaced) at a constant rate. The arrival time and the valuation is private information of each buyer and unobservable to the seller. Any incentive compatible mechanism has to induce truth-telling about the arrival time and the evolution of the valuation. We derive the optimal stationary mechanism in closed form and characterize its qualitative structure. As the arrival time is private information, the buyer can choose the time at which he reports his arrival. The truth-telling constraint regarding the arrival time can be represented as an optimal stopping problem. The stopping time determines the time at which the buyer decides to participate in the mechanism. The resulting value function of each buyer cannot be too convex and must be continuously differentiable everywhere, reflecting the option value of delaying participation. The optimal mechanism thus induces progressive participation by each buyer: he participates either immediately or at a future random time.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Dynamic mechanism design Observable arrival Unobservable arrival Repeated sales Interim incentive constraints Interim participation constraints Stopping problem Option value Progressive participation
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp15111
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/544070
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Dirk Bergemann,Philipp Strack. DP15111 Progressive Participation. 2020.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Dirk Bergemann]的文章
[Philipp Strack]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Dirk Bergemann]的文章
[Philipp Strack]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Dirk Bergemann]的文章
[Philipp Strack]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。