| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15044 |
| DP15044 Policies and Instruments for Self-Enforcing Treaties | |
| Bård Harstad; Francesco Lancia; Alessia Russo | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-07-15 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We characterize the optimal policy and policy instruments for self-enforcing treaties when countries invest in green technology before they pollute. If the discount factor is too small to support the first best, then both emissions and investments will be larger than in the first best, when technology is expensive. When technology is inexpensive, countries must instead limit or tax green investment in order to make future punishment credible. We also uncover a novel advantage of price regulation over quantity regulation, namely that when regulation is sufficiently flexible to permit firms to react to non-compliance in another country, the temptation to defect is reduced. The model is tractable and allows for multiple extensions. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Climate change Compliance Environmental agreements Green technology Policy instruments Repeated games Self-enforcing treaties |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15044 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543995 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Bård Harstad,Francesco Lancia,Alessia Russo. DP15044 Policies and Instruments for Self-Enforcing Treaties. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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