| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14984 |
| DP14984 Welfare improving tax evasion | |
| Chiara Canta; Helmuth Cremer; Firouz Gahvari | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-07-02 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study optimal income taxation in a framework where one's willingness to report his income truthfully is positively correlated with his type. We show that allowing low-productivity types to cheat leads to Pareto-superior outcomes as compared to deterring them, even if audits can be performed costlessly. When there is no cheating, redistribution takes place on first- and second-best frontiers and can never make low-ability types more well-off than high-ability types. Letting low-ability types cheat allows first-best redistribution up to a limit at which low-ability types are better off than high-ability types. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Optimal taxation Tax evasion Audits Welfare-improving |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14984 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543929 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Chiara Canta,Helmuth Cremer,Firouz Gahvari. DP14984 Welfare improving tax evasion. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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