| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14929 |
| DP14929 Managerial Duties and Managerial Biases | |
| Ulrike M. Malmendier; Vincenzo Pezone; Hui Zheng | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-06-24 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Traits and biases of CEOs are known to significantly affect corporate outcomes. However, analyzing individual managers in isolation can result in misattribution. Our analysis focuses on the role of CEO and CFO overconfidence in financing decisions. We show that, when considered jointly, the distorted beliefs of the CFO, rather than the CEO, dominate in generating pecking-order financing distortions. CEO overconfidence still matters indirectly for financing as the CEO's (and not CFO's) type determines investors' assessment of default risk and the resulting financing conditions. Moreover, overconfident CEOs tend to hire overconfident CFOs whenever given the opportunity, generating a multiplier effect. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14929 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543872 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ulrike M. Malmendier,Vincenzo Pezone,Hui Zheng. DP14929 Managerial Duties and Managerial Biases. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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