G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP14895
DP14895 Platform Mergers: Lessons from a Case in the Digital TV Market
Marc Ivaldi; Jiekai Zhang
发表日期2020-06-15
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要This paper contributes to the analysis of mergers in two-sided markets, notably those in which a platform provides its service for free on one side but obtains all its revenues from the other, as in the digital TV industry. Specifically, we assess a decision of the French competition authority which approved the merger of the broadcasting services of the TV channels involved but imposed a behavioral remedy prohibiting the merger of their respective advertising sales services. To do so, we build a structural model allowing for multi-homing of advertisers and, using a comprehensive dataset, we estimate the demand of viewers and advertisers. Our evaluation provides evidence that the remedy has been ineffective at limiting the increase in prices and amounts of advertising, due to the cross-side externalities between viewers and advertisers. Without resulting in significant positive effects on the viewers' surplus, the remedy has also drastically increased the advertisers' total cost. Nevertheless, the remedy has benefited the competitors of the merging channels. The main lesson of our analysis is that, in the process of designing competition or regulatory policy for two-sided markets, ignoring the interaction between the two sides of platforms can result in unexpected outcomes.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Two-sided market Platform merger Advertising Tv market Competition policy
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp14895
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543836
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Marc Ivaldi,Jiekai Zhang. DP14895 Platform Mergers: Lessons from a Case in the Digital TV Market. 2020.
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