G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP14830
DP14830 Monetary Policy with Opinionated Markets
Ricardo Caballero; Alp Simsek
发表日期2020-05-30
出版年2020
语种英语
摘要Central banks (the Fed) and markets (the market) often disagree about the path of interest rates. We develop a model where these different views stem from disagreements between the Fed and the market about future aggregate demand. We then study the implications of these disagreements for monetary policy, the term structure of interest rates, and economic activity. In our model, agents learn from the data but not from each other—they are opinionated. In this context, the market perceives monetary policy "mistakes" and the Fed partially accommodates the market's view to mitigate the impact of perceived "mistakes" on output and inflation. The Fed plans to implement its own view gradually, as it expects the market to receive more information and move closer to the Fed's belief. Disagreements about future demand, together with learning, translate into disagreements about future interest rates. Disagreements also provide a microfoundation for monetary policy shocks: after a surprise policy announcement, the market (partially) learns the Fed's belief and the extent of future "mistaken" interest rate changes. We categorize these shocks into three groups: Fed belief shocks, market reaction shocks, and tantrum shocks, and analyze their impact on forward interest rates and economic activity. Tantrum shocks are the most damaging, as they arise when the Fed fails to forecast the forward rates' reaction. These shocks motivate additional gradualism as well as communication policies that reveal the Fed's belief, not to persuade the market (which is opinionated) but to prevent a misinterpretation of the Fed's belief. Finally, we also find that disagreements affect inflation and create a policy trade-off between stabilizing output and inflation.
主题Financial Economics ; Monetary Economics and Fluctuations
关键词Monetary policy and shocks Aggregate demand shocks The fed's dot plot The term structure of interest rates Forward curve Confident disagreement Belief shocks Taper tantrum Communication Gradualism
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp14830-0
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543764
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Ricardo Caballero,Alp Simsek. DP14830 Monetary Policy with Opinionated Markets. 2020.
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