| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP14482
|
| DP14482 Misallocation in the Market for Inputs: Enforcement and the Organization of Production |
| Johannes Boehm; Ezra Oberfield
|
| 发表日期 | 2020-03-12
|
| 出版年 | 2020
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | The strength of contract enforcement determines how firms source inputs and organize production. Using microdata on Indian manufacturing plants, we show that production and sourcing decisions appear systematically distorted in states with weaker enforcement. Specifically, we document that in industries that tend to rely more heavily on relationship-specific intermediate inputs, plants in states with more congested courts shift their expenditures away from intermediate inputs and have a greater vertical span of production. To quantify the impact of these distortions on aggregate productivity, we construct a model in which plants have several ways of producing, each with different bundles of inputs. Weak enforcement exacerbates a holdup problem that arises when using inputs that require customization, distorting both the intensive and extensive margins of input use. The equilibrium organization of production and the network structure of input-output linkages arise endogenously from the producers' simultaneous cost minimization decisions. We identify the structural parameters that govern enforcement frictions from cross-state variation in the first moments of producers' cost shares. A set of counterfactuals show that enforcement frictions lower aggregate productivity to an extent that is relevant on the macro scale. |
| 主题 | Development Economics
; Industrial Organization
; International Trade and Regional Economics
; Macroeconomics and Growth
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14482
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543381
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Johannes Boehm,Ezra Oberfield. DP14482 Misallocation in the Market for Inputs: Enforcement and the Organization of Production. 2020.
|
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