| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14408 |
| DP14408 (Bad) Reputation in Relational Contracting | |
| Rahul Deb; Mallesh Pai; Matthew Mitchell | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-02-13 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Motivated by markets for "expertise," we study a bandit model where a principal chooses between a safe and risky arm. A strategic agent controls the risky arm and privately knows whether its type is high or low. Irrespective of type, the agent wants to maximize duration of experimentation with the risky arm. However, only the high type arm can generate value for the principal. Our main insight is that reputational incentives can be exceedingly strong unless both players coordinate on maximally inefficient strategies on path. We discuss implications for online content markets, term limits for politicians and experts in organizations. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Relational contracting Bad reputation Experts |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14408 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543302 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rahul Deb,Mallesh Pai,Matthew Mitchell. DP14408 (Bad) Reputation in Relational Contracting. 2020. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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