| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14039 |
| DP14039 Trading and shareholder democracy | |
| Doron Levit; Ernst Maug | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-02-01 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study shareholder voting in a model in which trading affects the composition of the shareholder base. Trading and voting are complementary, which gives rise to self-fulfilling expectations about proposal acceptance and multiple equilibria. Prices and shareholder welfare can move in opposite directions, so the former may be an invalid proxy for the latter. Increasing liquidity can reduce welfare, because it allows extreme shareholders to gain more weight in voting. Delegating decision-making to the board can improve shareholder value. However, the optimal board is biased, does not represent current shareholders, and may not garner support from the majority of shareholders. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Corporate governance Voting Shareholder rights Trading Delegation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14039-7 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543265 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Doron Levit,Ernst Maug. DP14039 Trading and shareholder democracy. 2020. |
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