| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14369 |
| DP14369 Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Actions | |
| Winand Emons; Severin Lenhard | |
| 发表日期 | 2020-01-31 |
| 出版年 | 2020 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | To encourage private actions for damages in antitrust cases some jurisdictions subtract a fraction of the redress from the fine. We analyze the effectiveness of this policy. Such a rebate does not encourage settlement negotiations that would otherwise not occur. If, however, the parties settle without the rebate, the introduction of the reduction increases the settlement amount, yet at the price of reduced deterrence for those wrongdoers who are actually fined. Under a leniency program the rebate has no effect on the leniency applicant: she doesn't pay a fine that can be reduced. The overall effect of a fine reduction on deterrence is, therefore, negative. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Antitrust Damages Deterrence Leniency |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14369 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543261 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Winand Emons,Severin Lenhard. DP14369 Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Actions. 2020. |
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