G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP14218
DP14218 Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Limited Enforcement
Marina Halac; Pierre Yared
发表日期2019-12-19
出版年2019
语种英语
摘要We study a fiscal policy model in which the government is present-biased towards public spending. Society chooses a fiscal rule to trade off the benefit of committing the government to not overspend against the benefit of granting it flexibility to react to privately observed shocks to the value of spending. Unlike prior work, we examine rules under limited enforcement: the government has full policy discretion and can only be incentivized to comply with a rule via the use of penalties which are joint and bounded. We show that optimal incentives must be bang-bang. Moreover, under a distributional condition, the optimal rule is a maximally enforced deficit limit, triggering the largest feasible penalty whenever violated. Violation optimally occurs under high enough shocks if and only if available penalties are weak and such shocks are rare. If the rule is self-enforced in a dynamic setting, penalties take the form of temporary overspending.
主题Macroeconomics and Growth ; Public Economics
关键词Private information Fiscal policy Deficit bias Enforcement constraints
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp14218
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/543105
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Marina Halac,Pierre Yared. DP14218 Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Limited Enforcement. 2019.
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