| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14071 |
| DP14071 Aristocratic Privilege. Exploiting “Good” Institutions | |
| Kim Oosterlinck; Loredana Ureche-Rangau; Jacques-Marie Vaslin | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-10-22 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | According to North and Weingast (1989), institutions that protect bondholders’ rights lower borrowing costs for the state and are therefore beneficial to both the state and the bondholders. In this paper we argue that such institutions may be so strong that bondholders can exploit them for their own benefit, not the state’s. To prove this point, we focus on the (non-)conversion of French bonds during the second quarter of the 19th century. At the time, France was able to convert its bonds. In other words, the state could ask bondholders to choose between redemption at par or a new bond with a lower coupon. Even though improvements in French credit meant the state could benefit from converting its debt as early as May 1825, no conversion took place before March 1852. Had it occurred at the first date, the French state would have saved the equivalent of 2.7 years of debt service. Our analysis shows that the institutions prevailing at the time gave large bondholders the power to veto any conversion. |
| 主题 | Economic History |
| 关键词 | Institutions Sovereign debts France Conversions |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14071-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542956 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kim Oosterlinck,Loredana Ureche-Rangau,Jacques-Marie Vaslin. DP14071 Aristocratic Privilege. Exploiting “Good” Institutions. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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