| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14049 |
| DP14049 Electoral Sentencing Cycles | |
| David Abrams; roberto galbiati; Arnaud Philippe | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-10-10 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Exploiting features of the North-Carolina judicial system, elections and forced rotation of judges, we overcome major challenges hampering the identification of the existence and source of sentencing variation over the electoral cycle. We show that when elections approach, sentencing for felonies increase. This increase is driven by decisions taken by judges present in their district of election, and only when elections are contested. When judges operate outside their district of elections, sentencing decisions do not significantly vary over the electoral cycle. Our results demonstrate the existence of strategic sentencing by judges in an attempt to please voters and allow us to discard alternative explanations for the rise along the cycle, such as behavioral motives or contextual explanations. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14049 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542935 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | David Abrams,roberto galbiati,Arnaud Philippe. DP14049 Electoral Sentencing Cycles. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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