| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14048 |
| DP14048 Rules versus Discretion in Bank Resolution | |
| Lucy White; Ansgar Walther | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-10-09 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Recent reforms give regulators broad powers to “bail-in” bank creditors during financial crises. We analyze efficient bail-ins and their implementation. To preserve liquidity, regulators must avoid signalling negative private information to creditors. Therefore, optimal bail-ins in bad times depend only on public information. As a result, the optimal policy cannot be implemented if regulators have wide discretion, due to an informational time-inconsistency problem. Rules mandating tough bail-ins after bad public signals, or contingent convertible (co-co) bonds, improve welfare. We further show that bail-in and bailout policies are complementary: if bailouts are possible, then discretionary bail-ins are more effective. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Bank resolution Financial crises Bail-in Bail-out Bank runs |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14048 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542934 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lucy White,Ansgar Walther. DP14048 Rules versus Discretion in Bank Resolution. 2019. |
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