| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14031 |
| DP14031 Tying in evolving industries, when future entry cannot be deterred | |
| Chiara Fumagalli; Massimo Motta | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-09-30 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We show that the incentive to engage in exclusionary tying (of two complementary products) may arise even when the incumbent's dominant position in the primary market cannot be protected. By engaging in tying, an incumbent firm sacrifices current profits but can exclude a more efficient rival from a complementary market by depriving it of the critical scale it needs to be successful. In turn, exclusion in the complementary market allows the incumbent to be in a favorable position when a more efficient rival will enter the primary market, and to appropriate some of the rival's efficiency rents. The paper also shows that tying is a more profitable exclusionary strategy than pure bundling, and that exclusion is the less likely the higher the proportion of consumers who multi-home. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Inefficient foreclosure Tying Scale economies Network externalities |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14031 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542919 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Chiara Fumagalli,Massimo Motta. DP14031 Tying in evolving industries, when future entry cannot be deterred. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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