| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13934 |
| DP13934 Sequential Learning | |
| Yair Antler; Daniel Bird; Santiago Oliveros | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-08-19 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Two players sequentially and privately examine a project of unknown quality. Launching the project requires mutual consent and the first player values the project more than the second player does. The combination of the conflict of interest and private learning leads to moral hazard. We show that an efficient equilibrium must take one of two forms as a function of the prior: either one player relinquishes control of the project, thereby rendering the collaboration moot, or the first player occasionally makes false claims about achieving positive findings. In the latter case, the players' relevant beliefs diverge as time progresses. In addition, we show that projects for which an initial examination failed to generate positive findings may be launched, and that projects known to be good by the first player may be delayed or even aborted. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13934 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542816 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Yair Antler,Daniel Bird,Santiago Oliveros. DP13934 Sequential Learning. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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