| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13912 |
| DP13912 Multiple Applications, Competing Mechanisms, and Market Power | |
| James Albrecht; Xiaoming Cai; Pieter A. Gautier; Susan Vroman | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-08-07 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a labor market with search frictions in which workers make multiple applications and firms can post and commit to general mechanisms that may be conditioned both on the number of applications received and on the number of offers received by its candidate. When the contract space includes application fees, there exists a continuum of equilibria of which only one is socially efficient. In the inefficient equilibria, firms have market power that arises from the fact that the value of a worker's application portfolio depends on what other firms offer, which allows individual firms to free ride and offer workers less than their marginal contribution. Finally, by allowing for general mechanisms, we are able to examine the sources of inefficiency in the multiple applications literature. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Multiple applications Directed search Competing mechanisms Efficiency market power |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13912 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542793 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | James Albrecht,Xiaoming Cai,Pieter A. Gautier,et al. DP13912 Multiple Applications, Competing Mechanisms, and Market Power. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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