| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13763 |
| DP13763 The Role of Electoral Incentives for Policy Innovation: Evidence from the U.S. Welfare Reform | |
| Andreas Bernecker; Pierre C Boyer | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-05-28 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper shows that electoral incentives matter for the decision to implement novel policies. Our empirical setting is the period prior to and following the U.S. welfare reform in 1996, which marked the most dramatic shift in social policy since the New Deal. Our findings indicate that governors with strong electoral support are less likely to experiment than governors with little support. Yet, governors who cannot be reelected actually experiment more than governors striving for reelection. These findings are robust to controlling for ideology, preferences for redistribution, the state legislature, and cross-state learning. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Policy innovation Electoral incentives Welfare reform Spillovers |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13763 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542629 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andreas Bernecker,Pierre C Boyer. DP13763 The Role of Electoral Incentives for Policy Innovation: Evidence from the U.S. Welfare Reform. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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