| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13574 |
| DP13574 Misallocation of Talent and Human Capital: Political Economy Analysis | |
| Mark Gradstein | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-03-08 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Mismatches in the labor market, specifically because of underrepresentation of various population groups, carry significant economic cost. In this paper we argue, using a simple analytical model, that an additional cost component is related to the effect of such underrepresentation on incentives to invest in human capital, which results in a mutual feedback relationship between the labor market and the skill acquisition market and may lead to economy’s divergence. Further, under increasing returns to scale in human capital, it is shown that an initially advantaged group has an incentive to minimize the bias against the disadvantaged group, and that political enfranchisement is the means to achieve a commitment to such a policy. It is argued that this is consistent with empirical regularities. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics and Growth ; Public Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13574 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542431 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mark Gradstein. DP13574 Misallocation of Talent and Human Capital: Political Economy Analysis. 2019. |
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