| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13526 |
| DP13526 Organizations with Power-Hungry Agents | |
| Wouter Dessein; Richard Holden | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-02-13 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze a model of hierarchies in organizations where neither decisions themselves nor the delegation of decisions are contractible, and where power-hungry agents derive a private benefit from making decisions. Two distinct agency problems arise and interact: Subordinates take more biased decisions (which favors adding more hierarchical layers), but uninformed superiors may fail to delegate (which favors removing layers). A designer may remove intermediate layers of the hierarchy (eliminate middle managers) or de-integrate an organization by removing top layers (eliminate top managers). We show that stronger preferences for power result in smaller, more de-integrated hierarchies. Our key insight is that hoarding of decision rights is especially severe at the top of the hierarchy. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Hierarchies Preferences for power Delegation Organization design |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13526 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542342 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Wouter Dessein,Richard Holden. DP13526 Organizations with Power-Hungry Agents. 2019. |
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