| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13458 |
| DP13458 Disclosure Regulation and Corporate Acquisitions | |
| Gaizka Ormazabal; Pietro Bonetti; Miguel Duro | |
| 发表日期 | 2019-01-16 |
| 出版年 | 2019 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper examines the effect of disclosure regulation on the takeover market. We study the implementation of a recent European regulation that imposes tighter disclosure requirements regarding the financial and ownership information on public firms. We find a substantial drop in the number of control acquisitions after the implementation of the regulation, a decrease that is concentrated in countries with more dynamic takeover markets. Consistent with the idea that the disclosure requirements increased acquisition costs, we also observe that, under the new disclosure regime, target (acquirer) stock returns around the acquisition announcement are higher (lower), and toeholds are substantially smaller. Overall, our evidence suggests that tighter disclosure requirements can impose significant acquisition costs on bidders and thus slow down takeover activity. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Disclosure regulation Market for corporate control Takeover laws Proprietary costs Mergers Acquisitions |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13458-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542273 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gaizka Ormazabal,Pietro Bonetti,Miguel Duro. DP13458 Disclosure Regulation and Corporate Acquisitions. 2019. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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