| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP13412
|
| DP13412 Strategic Fertility, Education Choices, and Conflicts in Deeply Divided Societies |
| David de la Croix
|
| 发表日期 | 2018-12-22
|
| 出版年 | 2018
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Fertility becomes a strategic choice when having a larger population helps to gain power. Minority groups might find it optimal to promote high fertility among their members - this is known as the "weapon of the womb" argument. If, in addition, parents have to invest resources to educate their children, a higher fertility for strategic motives might reduce their investment. Indonesian census data dispel this view, as minority religious groups do not invest less in education. If anything, they invest more in education, as well as in their number of children. This finding is consistent with human capital being an input to appropriation. Solving for the Nash equilibrium of a game between two groups
with two strategic variables, we derive the condition under which the minority group displays a higher investment in both the quantity and quality of children. The material cost of conflict involved through the weapon of the womb mechanism is mitigated when human capital enters the contest function. |
| 主题 | Development Economics
; Macroeconomics and Growth
|
| 关键词 | Fertility
Quality-quantity trade-off
Minorities
Conflict
Population engineering
Human capital
Nash equilibrium
Indonesia
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13412
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542225
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
David de la Croix. DP13412 Strategic Fertility, Education Choices, and Conflicts in Deeply Divided Societies. 2018.
|
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