| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13295 |
| DP13295 Information and Market Power | |
| Dirk Bergemann; Tibor Heumann; Stephen Morris | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-11-02 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider demand function competition with a finite number of agents and private information. We analyze how the structure of the private information shapes the market power of each agent and the price volatility. We show that any degree of market power can arise in the unique equilibrium under an information structure that is arbitrarily close to complete information. In particular, regardless of the number of agents and the correlation of payoff shocks, market power may be arbitrarily close to zero (so we obtain the competitive outcome) or arbitrarily large (so there is no trade in equilibrium). By contrast, price volatility is always less than the variance of the aggregate shock across agents across all information structures, hence we can provide sharp and robust bounds on some but not all equilibrium statistics. We then compare demand function competition with a different uniform price trading mechanism, namely Cournot competition. Interestingly, in Cournot competition, the market power is uniquely determined while the price volatility cannot be bounded by the variance of the aggregate shock. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13295 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542106 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dirk Bergemann,Tibor Heumann,Stephen Morris. DP13295 Information and Market Power. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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