G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP13267
DP13267 Burning Money? Government Lending in a Credit Crunch
Gabriel Jiménez; José-Luis Peydró; Rafael Repullo; Jesús Saurina
发表日期2018-10-20
出版年2018
语种英语
摘要We analyze a small, new credit facility of a Spanish state-owned-bank during the crisis, using its continuous credit scoring system, firm-level scores, and credit register data. Compared to privately-owned banks, the state-owned bank faces worse applicants, softens (tightens) its credit supply to unobserved (observable) riskier firms, and has much higher defaults. In a regression discontinuity design, the supply of public credit causes: large positive real effects to financially-constrained firms (whose relationship banks reduced substantially credit supply); crowding-in of new private-bank credit; and positive spillovers to other firms. Private returns of the credit facility are negative, while social returns are positive.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Real effects of public credit Credit scoring Credit crunch Crowding-in Adverse selection State-owned banks
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp13267
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542076
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Gabriel Jiménez,José-Luis Peydró,Rafael Repullo,et al. DP13267 Burning Money? Government Lending in a Credit Crunch. 2018.
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