| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13262 |
| DP13262 The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion | |
| Winand Emons | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-10-19 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. It chooses the probability of an investigation. Firms pick the degree of collusion: The more they collude, the higher are profits, but so is the probability of detection. Firms thus trade-off higher profits against higher expected fines. If firms are sufficiently patient, leniency is ineffective; it may even increase collusion. Increasing the probability of an investigation at low levels does not increase deterrence. Increasing the probability of an investigation at high levels reduces collusion, yet never completely. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Antitrust Cartels Deterrence Leniency |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13262 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542071 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Winand Emons. DP13262 The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion. 2018. |
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