| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13256 |
| DP13256 Legislative Restraint in Corporate Bailout Design | |
| Mark Gradstein; Michael Kaganovich | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-10-19 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The aftermath of the recent economic crisis saw the largest U.S. government bailout of corporate entities ever. While the bailout was carried out with the explicit goal of restoring stability, it aroused much controversy and public criticism based on moral hazard concerns as well as the exorbitant cost to the taxpayer. This paper examines the bailout design on behalf of an imperfectly informed legislature aimed at shaping the incentives of a policymaker to whom bailout decisions are delegated. We show that important elements of the design entail legislative procedural hurdles such as criteria for appointing policymaking executives, which favor selection of the types who are less susceptible to the costs of an economic crisis. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13256 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542065 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mark Gradstein,Michael Kaganovich. DP13256 Legislative Restraint in Corporate Bailout Design. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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