| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13250 |
| DP13250 Social Norms in Networks | |
| Philip Ushchev; Yves Zenou | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-10-16 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Although the linear-in-means model is the workhorse model in empirical work on peer effects, its theoretical properties are understudied. In this paper, we investigate how social norms affect individual effort, aggregate effort, and welfare. While individual productivity always positively affects own effort and utility, we show that taste for conformity has an ambiguous effect on individual outcomes and depends on whether an individual is above or below her own social norm. Equilibria are usually inefficient and, to restore the first best, the planner subsidizes (taxes) agents whose neighbors make efforts above (below) the social norms in equilibrium. Thus, provision of more subsidies to more central agents is not necessarily efficient. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Networks Social norms Welfare |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13250 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542059 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Philip Ushchev,Yves Zenou. DP13250 Social Norms in Networks. 2018. |
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