G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP13230
DP13230 Completing Markets with Contracts: Evidence from the First Central Clearing Counterparty
Guillaume Vuillemey
发表日期2018-10-09
出版年2018
语种英语
摘要I study the real effects a contracting innovation that suddenly made financial markets more complete: central clearing counterparties (CCPs) for derivatives. The first CCP to provide full insulation against counterparty risk was created in Le Havre (France) in 1882, in the coffee futures market. Using triple difference-in-differences estimation, I show that central clearing changed the geography of trade flows Europe-wide, to the benefit of Le Havre. Inspecting the mechanism using trader-level data, I show that the CCP was instrumental both to mitigate adverse selection issues and to solve a "missing market" problem. Increased risk-sharing possibilities enabled more gains from trade to be realized. The successful contractual innovation quickly spread to new exchanges.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Incomplete markets Contracts Central clearing International trade
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp13230
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542039
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Guillaume Vuillemey. DP13230 Completing Markets with Contracts: Evidence from the First Central Clearing Counterparty. 2018.
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