| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP13224
|
| DP13224 Regulation with Experimentation: Ex Ante Approval, Ex Post Withdrawal, and Liability |
| Marco Loseto; Marco Ottaviani
|
| 发表日期 | 2018-10-07
|
| 出版年 | 2018
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | The introduction of possibly unsafe products, the granting of patents, and more generally the dynamic adoption of activities with uncertain externalities are characterized by two phases. In the ex ante pre-introduction phase, costly experimentation is undertaken to decide whether it is worth entering the market or abandoning experimentation. In the ex post learning phase, the decision is made whether to stay in the market or withdraw following the accumulation of bad news. Through a novel and tractable continuous-time model featuring these two phases of ex ante experimentation and ex post learning, we draw positive and normative implications for the balance of the three main tools used to regulate private incentives: liability, withdrawal, and authorization. Shedding light on the preemption doctrine, we find that liability should be preempted to avoid chilling of activities that generate large positive externalities. For activities that generate small positive externalities, instead, liability should be used to discourage excessive experimentation. Authorization regulation should be lenient whenever it is used, consistent with how regulation is structured in a number of areas ranging from safety to patents. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Approval regulation
Liability
Withdrawal
Experimentation
Learning
Preemption doctrine
Persuasion
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13224-0
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542032
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Marco Loseto,Marco Ottaviani. DP13224 Regulation with Experimentation: Ex Ante Approval, Ex Post Withdrawal, and Liability. 2018.
|
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