全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP13217 Fatal Attraction? Extended Unemployment Benefits, Labor Force Exits, and Mortality

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP13217
	DP13217 Fatal Attraction? Extended Unemployment Benefits, Labor Force Exits, and Mortality
	Andreas Kuhn; Stefan Staubli; Jean-Philippe Wuellrich; Josef Zweimüller
发表日期	2018-10-04
出版年	2018
语种	英语
摘要	We estimate the causal effect of permanent and premature exits from the labor force on mortality. To overcome the problem of negative health selection into early retirement, we exploit a policy change in unemployment insurance rules in Austria that allowed workers in eligible regions to exit the labor force 3 years earlier compared to workers in non-eligible regions. Using administrative data with precise information on mortality and retirement, we find that the policy change induced eligible workers to exit the labor force significantly earlier. Instrumental variable estimation results show that for men retiring one year earlier causes a 6.8% increase in the risk of premature death and 0.2 years reduction in the age at death, but has no significant effect for women.
主题	Labour Economics ; Public Economics
关键词	Early retirement Mortality Health behavior Instrumental variable
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp13217
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542024
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Andreas Kuhn,Stefan Staubli,Jean-Philippe Wuellrich,et al. DP13217 Fatal Attraction? Extended Unemployment Benefits, Labor Force Exits, and Mortality. 2018.