全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP13207 What Does Earnings Management Signal? The Role of Managerial Honesty in Investment Decisions

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP13207
	DP13207 What Does Earnings Management Signal? The Role of Managerial Honesty in Investment Decisions
	Rajna Gibson Brandon; Matthias Sohn; Carmen Tanner; Alexander F. Wagner
发表日期	2018-09-26
出版年	2018
语种	英语
摘要	Accounting earnings management elicits varying reactions: To some observers, it signals low managerial honesty. To others, it indicates that firm managers are sharing private information. Accordingly, different investors may respond differently to this managerial behavior. To assess these responses in ways not available in archival studies, we conduct two laboratory experiments simulating investment choices. Participants perceive a CEO to be more committed to honesty when they infer that the CEO engaged less in earnings management. For investment decisions, a one standard deviation increase in a CEO's perceived commitment to honesty compared to another CEO reduces the relevance of differences in the CEOs’ claimed future returns by 40%. This effect is prominent among investors with a proself value orientation. To prosocial investors, their own honesty values and those attributed to the CEO matter directly; returns play a secondary role. Overall, perceived CEO honesty matters to different investors for distinct reasons.
主题	Financial Economics
关键词	Earnings management Honesty Investor preferences Investor segmentation Protected values Social value orientation Trust
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp13207-0
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542013
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Rajna Gibson Brandon,Matthias Sohn,Carmen Tanner,et al. DP13207 What Does Earnings Management Signal? The Role of Managerial Honesty in Investment Decisions. 2018.