| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13203 |
| DP13203 Should Straw Polls be Banned? | |
| Aislinn Bohren | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-09-25 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A Principal appoints a committee of partially informed experts to choose a policy. The experts' preferences are aligned with each other but conflict with hers. We study whether she gains from banning committee members from communicating or "deliberating'' before voting. Our main result is that if the committee plays its preferred equilibrium and the Principal must use a threshold voting rule, then she does not gain from banning deliberation. We show using examples how she can gain if she can choose the equilibrium played by the committee, or use a non-anonymous or non-monotone social choice rule. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Information aggregation Committees Deliberation Collusion |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13203 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/542007 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Aislinn Bohren. DP13203 Should Straw Polls be Banned?. 2018. |
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