| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13173 |
| DP13173 Verifying High Quality: Entry for Sale | |
| Lars Persson; Pehr-Johan Norbäck; Roger Svensson | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-09-11 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | When and how do entrepreneurs sell their inventions? To address this issue, we develop an endogenous entry-sale asymmetric information oligopoly model. We show that low quality inventions are sold directly or used for own entry. Inventors who sell post-entry use entry to credibly reveal information on quality. Incumbents are then willing to pay high prices for high-quality inventions to preempt rivals from obtaining them. Using Swedish data on patents granted to small firms and individuals, we find evidence that high-quality inventions are sold under preemptive bidding competition, post entry. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Acquisitions Innovation Start-ups Ownership Patents Verification Quality |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13173 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541977 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lars Persson,Pehr-Johan Norbäck,Roger Svensson. DP13173 Verifying High Quality: Entry for Sale. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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