| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13007 |
| DP13007 Adverse Selection, Efficiency and the Structure of Information | |
| Heski Bar-Isaac; Ian Jewitt; Clare Leaver | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-06-20 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper explores how the structure of asymmetric information impacts on economic outcomes in Akerlof’s (1970) Lemons model applied to the labor market and extended to admit a matching component between worker and firm. For efficiency, only good matches should be retained. We characterize the nature of equilibrium and show that, for any Gaussian information structure, both adverse selection and efficiency depend on the realization of information only through the conditional expectation of match value given public information. We derive a parsimonious parameterization of all Gaussian information structures and establish comparative statics results. Using this framework, we address five natural questions. What is the effect of more public information? Which information structures impose adverse selection efficiently, and inefficiently? What is the effect of more private information? When is there positive selection into outside firms? When is the average wage of released workers higher than the average wage of retained workers? |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Information design Adverse selection Asymmetric information |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13007 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541814 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Heski Bar-Isaac,Ian Jewitt,Clare Leaver. DP13007 Adverse Selection, Efficiency and the Structure of Information. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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