| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP12834
|
| DP12834 Waiting for my neighbors |
| [unavailable]
|
| 发表日期 | 2018-03-31
|
| 出版年 | 2018
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We introduce a neighborhood structure in waiting games where the players decide when to``stop" (exit a market, adopt a technology). The payoff of stopping increases each time a neighbor stops. We show that the dynamic evolution of the network starkly depends on initial parameters and can take the form of either a shrinking network, where players at the edges stop first, or a fragmenting network where interior players stop first making the network split up in smaller ones over time. We find that, in addition to the coordination inefficiency standard in waiting games, the neighbourhood structure gives rise to two other inefficiencies, the first linked to the order of exit and the second to the final distribution of remaining nodes. We consider subsidy programs aimed at correcting these inefficiencies. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Waiting games
Networks
Inefficiencies
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12834
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541644
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
[unavailable]. DP12834 Waiting for my neighbors. 2018.
|
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
