| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12802 |
| DP12802 Benefit reentitlement conditions in unemployment insurance schemes | |
| Torben M Andersen; Michael Svarer | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-03-21 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The past employment history - employment requirements - is part of the eligibility conditions for unemployment insurance in most western countries. In a standard search-matching model, we show how employment requirements strengthen the reentitlement effect and thereby changes the trade-off between insurance and incentives in the design of the optimal insurance scheme. Deploying employment requirements for benefit eligibility may thus allow for both higher benefit levels and longer duration, and yet labor market performance is improved. When the need for insurance increases due to higher risk aversion, employment requirements becomes less lenient, and oppositely when the environment becomes more risky. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Reentitlement effects Incentives Job-search Unemployment insurance |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12802 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541611 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Torben M Andersen,Michael Svarer. DP12802 Benefit reentitlement conditions in unemployment insurance schemes. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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