| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12759 |
| DP12759 Horizontal Mergers and Product Innovation | |
| Tommaso Valletti; Gregor Langus | |
| 发表日期 | 2018-02-27 |
| 出版年 | 2018 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We set up a stylized oligopoly model of uncertain product innovation to analyze the effects of a merger on innovation incentives and on consumer surplus. The model incorporates two competitive channels for merger effects: the "price coordination" channel and the internalization of the "innovation externality". We solve the model numerically and find that price coordination between the two products of the merged firm tends to stimulate innovation, while internalization of the innovation externality depresses it. The latter effect is stronger in our simulations and, as a result, the merger leads to lower innovation incentives for the merged entity, absent cost efficiencies and knowledge spillovers. In our numerical analysis both overall innovation and consumer welfare fall after a merger. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Innovation R&d Mergers |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12759 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/541569 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Tommaso Valletti,Gregor Langus. DP12759 Horizontal Mergers and Product Innovation. 2018. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
